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Abstract— When a human supervisor collaborates with a
team of robots, the human’s attention is divided, and cognitive
resources are at a premium. We aim to optimize the distribution
of these resources and the flow of attention. To this end, we
propose the model of an idealized supervisor to describe human
behavior. Such a supervisor employs a potentially inaccurate
internal model of the the robots’ dynamics to judge safety. We
represent these safety judgements by constructing a safe set
from this internal model using reachability theory. When a
robot leaves this safe set, the idealized supervisor will intervene
to assist, regardless of whether or not the robot remains
objectively safe. False positives, where a human supervisor
incorrectly judges a robot to be in danger, needlessly consume
supervisor attention. In this work, we propose a method that
decreases false positives by learning the supervisor’s safe set
and using that information to govern robot behavior. We prove
that robots behaving according to our approach will reduce the
occurrence of false positives for our idealized supervisor model.
Furthermore, we empirically validate our approach with a user
study that demonstrates a significant (p = 0.0328) reduction in
false positives for our method compared to a baseline safety
controller.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
As automation becomes more pervasive throughout so-
ciety, humans will increasingly find themselves interacting
with autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. These in-
teractions have the potential to multiply the productivity of
humans workers, since it will become possible for a single
human to supervise the behavior of multiple robotic agents.
For example, a single human driver could manage a fleet of
self-driving delivery robots, but the driver would only take
full control for the “last mile,” guiding the robots to precisely
deposit packages in environments where autonomous navi-
gation may not be reliable. Human experts regularly serve
as failsafe supervisors on factory assembly floors staffed
with robotic arms [13]. Air traffic controllers soon will have
to manage completely autonomous drones flying through
their airspace alongside existing traditional mixed-autonomy
planes and their auto-pilots [19].
While a human may be able to successfully exert direct
control over a single robot, it becomes intractable for a
human to directly control teams of robots (in fact, humans
often benefit from automated assistance when controlling
even a single robot, as discussed in the literature on assistive
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Fig. 1. Top: if a robot’s behavior does not take into account a human
supervisor’s notion of safety, the misaligned expectations can degrade team
performance. Bottom: When a robot acts according to a human supervisor’s
expectations, the supervisor can more easily predict the robot’s behavior.
teleoperation [7], [15]). In order to manage the increased
complexity of multi-robot teams, the human must be able
to rely on increased autonomy from the robots, freeing the
human to focus their attention only on those areas where
they are most needed. Our goal is to model what grabs the
supervisor’s attention in order to modify robot behavior to
reduce the occurrence of distractions.
This project is inspired by work like Bajcsy et al [3] and
Jain et al [14] that learn from supervisor interventions in a
“coactive” learning framework. These works apply Learning
from Demonstration techniques to the more challenging
domain where the given data is just a correction from a
trajectory rather than a full trajectory. The authors of [3]
posed this correction challenge in model-based framework
that interprets the human’s signals as resulting from an
optimization problem. This inverse optimization framework
has also been used in Inverse Reinforcement Learning [1],
[20] which applies Inverse Optimal Control (as conceived of
by Kalman [16]) to interpreting human trajectories. Our work
applies the inverse optimization framework to learn from the
supervisor’s decisions to intervene.
Results in cognitive science suggest that humans observing
physical scenes can be modeled as performing a noisy
“mental simulation” to predict trajectories [4], [18]. We posit
that human supervisors utilize this same cognitive dynamic
simulation to predict robot safety and intervene accordingly.
Specifically, we theorize that the intervention behavior is
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driven by an internal “safe set” which we can attempt to
reconstruct by observing supervisor interventions.
Safe sets are conceived from the Formal Methods notion of
“Viability”. A set of states is “viable” if for every state in the
set there exists a dynamic trajectory that stays within the set
for all time. Reachability analysis calculates the largest viable
set that doesn’t include any undesirable state configurations
(e.g. collisions with obstacles, power overloads, etc). Since
the set is viable, it is possible to guarantee that the dynamic
system will always stay within the set and therefore stay
safely away from the undesirable states. For this reason, via-
bility kernels are often refered to as “safe sets”. Reachability
can be used for robust path planning in dynamically changing
environments [9] or working around multiple dynamic agents
[5], and recent results have leveraged the technique to bound
tracking error in order to generate dynamically feasible paths
using simple planning algorithms [11].
Hoffman et al. used the safety guarantees of reacha-
bility analysis to engineer a multi-drone team that could
automatically avoid collisions [12]. Similarly, Gillula could
guarantee safety for learning algorithms by constraining their
explorations to stay within the safe set [10]. Extending this,
Akametalu and Tomlin [2] were able to guarantee safety
while simultaneously learning and expanding the safe set.
All of these controllers supervise otherwise un-guaranteed
systems and intervene to maintain safety whenever the sys-
tem threatens to leave the viable safe set. In this paper, we
explore how this intervention behavior is similar to human
supervision, and apply this to representing human safety
concerns as safe sets in the state space.
II. SUPERVISOR SAFE SET CONTROL
Based on the success of cognitive dynamical models for
explaining humans’ understanding of physical systems, we
posit that human operators may have some notion of reach-
able sets which they employ to predict collisions or avoid
obstacles. We propose a noisy idealized model to describe the
behavior of the human supervisor of a robotic team, and we
develop a framework for estimating the human supervisor’s
mental model of a dynamical system based on observing
their interactions with the team. We then propose a control
framework that capitalizes on this learned information to
improve collaboration in such human-robot teams.
A. Preliminaries: Reachability for Safety
Consider a dynamical system with bounded input u and
bounded disturbance d, given by
x˙ = f(x, u, d),
x ∈ Rn, u ∈ U ⊂ Rnu , d ∈ D ⊂ Rnd , (1)
where U and D are compact. We let U and D denote
the sets of measurable functions u : [0,∞) → U and
d : [0,∞) → D, respectively, which represent possible
time histories for the system input and disturbance. Given a
choice of input and disturbance signals, there exists a unique
continuous trajectory ξ : [0,∞)→ Rn from any initial state
x which solves
ξ˙(t) = f(ξ(t),u(t),d(t)), a.e. t ≥ 0,
ξ(0) = x,
(2)
where ξ(·) describes the evolution of the dynamical sys-
tem [6].
Obstacles in the environment can be modeled as a “keep-
out” set of states K ⊂ Rn that the system must avoid. We
define the safety of the system with respect to this set, such
that the system is considered to be safe at state ξ(0) = x
over time horizon T as long as we can choose u(·) to
guarantee that there exists no time t ∈ [0, T ] for which
ξ(t) ∈ K. The task of maintaining the system’s safety over
this interval can be modeled as a differential game between
the control input and the disturbance. Consider an optimal
control signal u(·) which attempts to steer the system away
from K and an optimal disturbance d(·) which attempts
to drive the system towards K. By choosing any Lipschitz
payoff function l : Rn → R which is negative-valued for
x ∈ K and positive for x /∈ K, we can encode the outcome of
this game via a value function V (x, t) characterized by the
following Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs variational inequality [8]:
min
{
l(x)− V (x, t),
∂V
∂t (x, t) + maxu∈U
min
d∈D
∂V
∂x (x, t)· f(x, u, d)
= 0
V (x, T ) = l(x).
(3)
The value function V (x, t) that satisfies the above con-
ditions is equal to minτ∈[t,T ] l(ξ∗(τ)) for the trajectory
with ξ∗(t) = x driven by an optimal control u(·) and an
optimal disturbance d(·). We can therefore find the set of
states RT = {x ∈ Rn :V (x, 0) < 0} from which we cannot
guarantee the safety of the system on the interval [0, T ],
also known as the backward-reachable set of K over this
interval. That is, for all initial states x ∈ RT and feedback
control polices u(t) = g(ξ(t)), there exists some disturbance
d(·) ∈ D such that ξ(t) ∈ K for some t ∈ [0, T ].
If there exists a non-empty controlled-invariant set Ω that
does not intersect K, then we deem this set Ω a “safe set”
because there exists a feedback policy that guarantees that
the system remains in Ω, and thus out of K, for all time.
It follows from their properties that Ω is the complement
of RT , and the relationship between K, RT , and Ω is
visualized in Fig. 2. Within a safe set Ω, the value function
becomes independent of t as T → ∞ [8]. Because we
focus on the case where the system is initialized to some
safe state ξ(0) ∈ Ω and we aim to maintain ξ(t) ∈ Ω for
all t ∈ [0,∞), we simplify notation by defining the terms
V (x) , limT→∞ V (x, ·) and R , R∞.
One approach to guaranteeing the safety of the system is
to apply a “minimally invasive” controller which activates
on the zero level set of V (x) [10]. This approach allows
complete flexibility of control as long as ξ(t) ∈ interior(Ω),
and applies the optimal control to avoid K when ξ(·) reaches
the boundary of Ω. We refer the interested reader to [10], [8]
Fig. 2. Illustration of the relationship between a keep-out set K, the derived
backward-reachable set R, and the resulting safe set Ω. Note that K ⊆ R,
and Ω is equal to the complement of R. This illustration approximates the
result obtained using the Dubins car dynamics given in (10).
for a more thorough treatment of reachability and minimally
invasive controllers.
B. Noisy Idealized Supervisor Model
We define an idealized model of the supervisor of a
robotic team whose responsibility it is to ensure that no
robots collide with obstacles represented by the keep-out
set K. The idealized supervisor behaves as a minimally
invasive controller as described in Section II-A. However,
while the robotic team members’ true dynamics are given
by the function f(x, u, d) as in (1), the supervisor pos-
sesses an internal model of the robots’ dynamics given
by fS(x, u, d), which is not necessarily equal to the true
dynamics. Following the differential game characterized by
(3), the supervisor also possesses an internal value function
VS(·) and safe set ΩS which they use to evaluate the safety of
each state x in the environment. We allow for the possibility
that the supervisor adds some amount of margin µ to their
internal safe set, such that ΩS = {x ∈ Rn :VS(x) ≥ µ}.
Therefore, the idealized supervisor will always intervene
when a robotic team member reaches the µ level set of
VS(·), rather than the zero level set of the true V (·). We
further specify that the idealized supervisor is conserva-
tive: ∀x ∈ Rn, V (x) ≤ 0 =⇒ VS(x) ≤ µ. This condition
implies that the supervisor will never let a robot teammate
leave the true safe set Ω since ΩS ⊆ Ω. Additionally, we
propose a noisy version of this idealized supervisor: the noisy
idealized supervisor will intervene when they observe a robot
reach the µ+ w level set of VS(·), where w is drawn from
N (0, σ2S) whenever a supervisor makes a safety judgement.
C. Learning Safe Sets from Supervisor Interventions
We choose to model the human supervisor of a robotic
team as approximating the behavior of the idealized super-
visor model presented in Section II-B. That is, the human
supervisor will allow the robots to perform their task however
they choose, but intervene whenever they perceive that a
robot is approaching an obstacle K in the state space. Given
this model, we can interpret the points at which the human
intervenes as corresponding to the unknown µ level set of
some value function VH(·) : Rn → R, which character-
izes the human’s mental safe set ΩH . Our goal is to use
observations of human interventions to derive an estimated
value function VˆH(·) and µˆ which describe the observed
behavior and induce an estimated ΩˆH . We approach this
task by deriving a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE)
of the human’s mental safe set. If we assume that a human
supervisor always intends to intervene at the µ level set of
VH(x), but their ability to precisely intervene at this level is
subject to Gaussian noise, either from observation error or
variability in reaction time, then we can consider the value
at an intervention point xi as being drawn from a normal
distribution centered at µ (that is, VH(xi) ∼ N (µ, σ2)).
Given a proposed value function VˆH(·) and a set of inter-
vention points {x1, x2, · · · , xp} with corresponding values
{VˆH(x1), VˆH(x2), · · · , VˆH(xp)}, we wish to estimate the
most likely µ and σ2 to explain these interventions. Gaussian
distributions induce the following probability density func-
tion for a single observation VˆH(xj)
f
(
VˆH(xj) | µ, σ2
)
=
1√
2piσ2
exp
−
(
VˆH(xj)− µ
)2
2σ2

(4)
which leads to the following probability density for a set of
p independent observations
f
(
VˆH(x1), · · · , VˆH(xp) | µ, σ2
)
=
p∏
j=1
f
(
VˆH(xj) | µ, σ2
)
=
(
1
2piσ2
) p
2
exp
−
∑p
j=1
(
VˆH(xj)− µ
)2
2σ2
 .
(5)
The likelihood of any estimated parameter values µˆ
and σˆ2 being correct, given the observations and
the proposed value function VˆH(·), is expressed as
L
(
µˆ, σˆ2 | VˆH(·)
)
= f
(
VˆH(x1), · · · , VˆH(xp) | µˆ, σˆ2
)
. It
can be shown that the values of the unknown parameters µ
and σ2 that maximize the likelihood function are given by
µˆ∗ =
1
p
p∑
j=1
VˆH(xj) and σˆ∗2 =
1
p
p∑
j=1
(
VˆH(xj)− µˆ∗
)2
,
(6)
which are simply the mean and variance of the set of
observations.
Notice that the estimates given by (6) are computed with
respect to a given value function VˆH(·). If we were to
assume that the human supervisor has a perfect model of
the system dynamics, then we could simply set VˆH(·) to
equal the true V (·) of the system in (1), and µˆ∗ would
be the maximum likelihood estimate for the level at which
the supervisor will intervene. However, it is unlikely that a
human supervisor’s notion of the dynamics will correspond
exactly to this model, and we would like to maintain the
flexibility of estimating value functions that are not strictly
derived from (1). To this end, we define the maximum
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Fig. 3. Two dimensional slices of the zero level sets of the value functions
Vi(·) from the library used for the experiment described in Section III. We
used a family of Dubins car dynamics (see (10)) parametrized by ωmax.
Notice that as ωmax decreases (the modeled control authority is decreased),
the level sets extend farther away from the obstacle, indicating that a robot
is expected to turn earlier to guarantee safety.
likelihood of VˆH(·) being the VH(·) that produced our
observations as L∗(VˆH(·)) = maxµˆ,σˆ2 L(µˆ, σˆ2 | VˆH(·)). The
value of L∗(VˆH(·)) is obtained by substituting the estimates
from (6) into the probability density function from (5). That
is, L∗
(
VˆH(·)
)
= f
(
VˆH(x1), · · · , VˆH(xp) | µˆ∗, σˆ∗2
)
.
We seek the most likely value function to explain our
observations, which will be the value function Vˆ ∗(·) with
the greatest maximum likelihood L∗(Vˆ ∗(·)) (the maximum
over maxima)
Vˆ ∗(·) = arg max
V (·)∈V
L∗ (V (·)) , (7)
where V is the set of all possible value functions.
In order to make this optimization tractable, we can restrict
ourselves to a set of value functions {Vθ(·)}θ∈Rm corre-
sponding to a family of dynamics functions {fθ(·, ·, ·)}θ∈Rm
parameterized by θ ∈ Rm, making the optimization in
question
Vˆ ∗(·) = arg max
θ∈Rm
L∗ (Vθ(·)) . (8)
In practice, we may not be able to find an expression
for the gradient of L∗(Vθ(·)) with respect to θ, since the
value function is derived from the dynamics fθ(·, ·, ·) via
the differential game given by (3). The lack of a gradient
expression restricts the use of numerical methods to solve the
problem as presented in (8). In these cases, we can compute
a representative library of b value functions {Vi(·)}bi=1
corresponding to a set of b representative parameter values
{θi}bi=1 (see Fig. 3 for an example library). The optimization
then reduces to choosing the most likely value function from
among this library
Vˆ ∗(·) = arg max
i∈{1,··· ,b}
L∗ (Vi(·)) . (9)
In order to ensure that the learned safe set is conservative,
we can extend our MLE to a Maximum A Posteriori (MAP)
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Fig. 4. An example data set from the experiment described in Section III.
The red circles represent the location of supervisor interventions, and the
colored background represents the learned value function V (·) with contour
lines shown in black. In this case, the learning algorithm chose a dynamics
model parametrized by ωmax = 0.75.
estimator by incorporating our prior belief that, regardless of
the safe set that the supervisor uses to generate interventions,
they do not want the robots to be unsafe with respect to
the true dynamics. In this case, we maintain a uniform
prior P (θ) that assigns equal probability to all Vθ(·) whose
zero sublevel sets are supersets of the zero sublevel set
of the true V (·), and zero probability to all other Vθ(·).
In other words, we assume that the supervisor does not
overestimate the agility of the robots, and in practice we can
enforce this condition by choosing the library in (9) to only
contain appropriate value functions. Moreover, regardless of
the choice of VˆH(·), we assume that the supervisor intends to
intervene before reaching the zero level set of VˆH(·), which
always includes the boundary of K. If we choose a prior
P (µ) that assigns zero probability to all non-positive µ and
uniform probability elsewhere, it can be shown that the MAP
estimates are obtained by letting µˆ∗ equal max {µˆ∗, 0} and
otherwise proceeding as before. Fig. 4 provides an example
of this algorithm estimating a safe set from human supervisor
intervention data.
D. Team Control with Learned Safe Sets
We propose that safe sets learned according to the ap-
proach in Section II-C can be used to create effective control
laws for the robotic members of human-robot teams. Recall
our model of the human supervisor of a robotic team: the
supervisor must rely on each robot’s autonomy to complete
the majority of their tasks unassisted, but the supervisor
may intervene to correct a robot’s behavior when necessary
(such as by avoiding an imminent collision with the keep-out
set K). We put forth that in the scenario where the human
intervenes to prevent a collision, they do so because they
observe that a robot has violated the boundaries of their
mental safe set ΩH .
Now, consider a team of robots navigating an unknown
environment, and which are able to avoid any obstacles that
they detect. One approach to safely automating this team is
to have each robot behave according to a minimally invasive
control law: the robots are allowed to follow trajectories
generated by any planning algorithm, so long as they remain
within Ω, the reachable set computed using the baseline
dynamics model (1) with associated value function V (·).
Whenever these robots detect an obstacle, they add it to the
keep-out set K, thus modifying Ω and V (·). If a robot reaches
the boundary of Ω, it applies the optimal control to avoid K
until it has cleared the obstacle. However, it is possible that
a robot does not detect an obstacle, and a human supervisor
must intervene to ensure robot safety.
As stated above, the human supervisor will intervene when
a robot reaches the boundary of ΩH , not the boundary
of Ω. This discrepancy leads to the possibility that the
supervisor will intervene when the robot reaches some state
x, even if the robot would have avoided the obstacle without
intervention. These situations arise whenever VH(x) ≤ µ
but V (x) > 0. These “false positive” interventions represent
unnecessary work for the human supervisor, and we seek to
eliminate them in order to improve the human’s experience
and the team’s overall performance.
We propose using a safe set ΩˆH learned from previous ob-
servations of supervisor interventions, as outlined in Section
II-C, as a substitute for Ω in the robots’ minimally invasive
control law. By estimating the human’s internal safe set, we
take advantage of the following property:
Property. For an idealized supervisor collaborating with a
team of robots as described in Section II-D, if the robots
avoid detected obstacles K by applying an optimally safe
control at the boundary of safe set ΩS , then if the supervisor
plans to intervene because they observe ξi(t) ∈ RS for robot
i, the supervisor can infer that robot i has not detected an
obstacle and any supervisor intervention will not be a false
positive.
Proof. The proof of this property follows constructively
from the definitions of safe set, idealized supervisor, and
false positive. If robot i had correctly detected an obstacle
and adjusted its representation of ΩS accordingly, then it
would have applied the optimal control to remain within the
supervisor’s safe set. Therefore, if the supervisor is able to
observe that robot i has left ΩS , it must be the case that
the robot has not detected the obstacle. False positives are
defined to be supervisor interventions that occur when a robot
has detected an obstacle but the supervisor still intervenes.
In this case, the supervisor can correctly infer that robot i
has not detected an obstacle, so any intervention at this point
cannot be a false positive. 
For an idealized supervisor, as ΩˆS becomes an arbitrarily
good approximation of ΩS , the number of false positive inter-
ventions will approach zero. For a noisy idealized supervisor,
the supervisor will intervene whenever VS(x)+w ≤ µ where
w ∼ N (0, σ2S). This noise will continue to produce false
positives, even with a perfect fit ΩˆS = ΩS , if the robots
Fig. 5. Safe sets tested in experiment (illustrated by their complementary
reachable set): (left) Standard safe set (calculated from true dynamics and
obstacle size), (middle) example Learned safe set (calculated from fitted
supervisory perception of dynamics and obstacle size), (right) Conservative
safe set (calculated from true dynamics and inflated obstacle size)
apply the optimally safe control at the µ-level set of ΩS .
Instead, the level set α where the optimally safe control
is applied can be raised arbitrarily high to drive the false
positive rate to zero. For example, α = µ+ 2σS is sufficient
to avoid over 97% of intervention states used for learning,
in expectation. We test the efficacy of our approach through
the human-subjects experiment described in Section III.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN FOR USER VALIDATION
Our goal in understanding and modeling the supervisor’s
conception of safety is to improve team performance by
decreasing cognitive overload. Although we have based our
human modeling on the cognitive science literature, we
do not intend to verify humans’ exact cognitive processes.
Instead, we aim to apply our inspiration from cognitive
science toward building better human-robot teams. To this
end, our hypotheses are:
1) H1: Representing supervisor behavior as cognitive
keep-out sets allows intervention signals to be distilled into
an actionable rule which will decrease supervisory false
positives and cognitive strain, thereby increasing team per-
formance and trust.
2) H2: Fitting danger-avoidance behavior to a supervi-
sor’s beliefs is preferable to generic conservative behavior.
In our experiment, we gather supervisor intervention data,
fit our model to the data, and then run a human-robot teaming
task that assesses performance.
A. Procedure
Our experiment applies the idealized supervisor theory
and learning algorithm to supervising simulated robots. The
robots moved according to the Dubins car model:
x˙ = 3 cos(θ)
y˙ = 3 sin(θ)
θ˙ = u
u ∈ U = [−ωmax, ωmax], ωmax = 1
(10)
The experiment is divided into three phases. In Phase I,
the subject is given an opportunity to familiarize themselves
with the robotic system’s dynamics. The user is allowed to
directly apply the full range of controls through the computer
keyboard for one minute. After ensuring the user has some
experience from which to build an internal dynamics model,
we then assess their emergent conception of safety. In
Phase II, supervisory data is extracted from the subject by
Fig. 6. Screenshot of the task from Phase III of the experiment. Robotic
vehicles make trips back and forth across the screen, detecting and avoiding
each obstacle with 80% probability. The human supervisor must remove an
obstacle in the event that it is undetected, but must infer this information
from the robots’ motion.
showing them scenes where the robot is driving towards an
obstacle, and the supervisor decides where to intervene to
avoid a crash. This intervention data is then fed into our
algorithm (described in Section II-C) that extracts the best
fitting safe set. Our estimator used a library of candidate
dynamics functions parameterized by values of ωmax be-
tween 0 and 3, as shown in Fig. 3. In this experiment,
we enforced conservativeness by excluding subjects whose
Learned sets were not supersets of the Standard safe set,
rather than enforcing a prior directly on ωmax. The Learned
safe set is assessed in Phase III against two fixed safe sets
(see Fig. 5) pre-calculated from the true dynamic equations.
These safe sets were calculated using Hamilton-Jacobi
reachability as described in Section II-A using the Level
Set Toolbox [17] for MATLAB. During this final phase,
the subject sequentially supervises homogeneous teams of
robots, each team avoiding obstacles based on one of the
three assessed safe sets. Ten randomly placed obstacles are
strewn about the screen impeding the robots’ autonomous
trips back and forth across the screen (see Fig. 6). Although
robots will detect and avoid an obstacles in 80% of their
interactions with it, there is a 20% chance that the robot
will not detect an obstacle as it approaches. The subject is
charged with catching these random failures and removing an
obstacle before the robot crashes. Crashing is disincentivized
by decrementing an on-screen “score” counter. Removing an
obstacle costs only half of what a crash costs the player. This
system encourages saving the robot but not guessing wildly.
Moreover, simply clearing out all obstacles is not a viable
strategy because every obstacle removed generates a new
obstacle elsewhere. This score mechanism was also used to
make the participant invested in team success by awarding
points every time a robot completes a trip across the screen.
B. Independent Variables
To assess our hypotheses, we manipulate the safe set used
between team supervision trials. We exposed the human sub-
ject to three teams, each driving using one of three safe sets.
The Learned set is derived from Phase II supervisor inter-
vention observations as described in Section II, using α = µ.
The two baseline kernels are calculated using Hamilton-
Jacobi-Isaacs reachability on the true dynamic equations. The
Standard set is calculated using the true obstacle size. The
Conservative set adds a buffer that doubles the effective size
of the obstacle, inducing trajectories that give obstacles a
wide berth.
C. Dependent Measures
1) Objective Measures: The team was tasked with making
trips across the screen to reach randomized goals. The robots’
task was to travel across the screen, safely dodging obstacles
along the way, while the human was tasked with supervising
as a failsafe to remove an obstacle if the robots should fail
to observe and avoid it.
Team performance was quantified using three objective
metrics: number of trips completed, number of supervisory
interventions, and the number of obstacle collisions. These
metrics were presented to the subject as an aggregated,
arcade-style score. To incentivize participants to only inter-
vene when necessary, obstacle-removal interventions reduced
the score, but only by half as much as an obstacle collision.
The number of interventions taken by the supervisor can
also serve as a proxy measurement to quantify the amount
of cognitive strain they experience while working with the
robotic team. Of particular note are the number of inter-
ventions that were not actually required, as the supervisor
incorrectly judged that a robot had not detected an obstacle.
These false positives needlessly drain supervisor attention
and indicate a lack of trust in the system. We aim to increase
the human’s trust in the system, which we quantify by a
decrease in these false positives.
2) Subjective Measures: After each round of pairwise
comparison (completing the task with two different robotic
teams), we presented the subject with a questionnaire to
gauge how the choice of safe set impacted their experience.
These questionnaires contained statements about each team
that subjects would respond to using a 7-point Likert scale (1
- Strongly Disagree, 7 - Strongly Agree). These statements
were designed to measure Trust, Perceived Performance,
Interpretability, Confidence, Team Fluency, and overall Pref-
erence between the teams in the comparison.
D. Subject Allocation
The subject population consisted of 6 male, 5 female,
and 1 non-binary participants between the ages of 18-29.
We used a within-subjects design where each subject was
asked to complete all three possible pairwise comparisons
of our three treatments (the safe sets used). We used a
balanced Latin Square design for the order of comparisons,
with no treatment being first in a pair twice. Furthermore,
we generated six randomized versions of the task so that
subjects were presented with a different version of the task
for each trial across the three pairwise comparisons. To avoid
coupling the treatment results to a particular version of the
task, each treatment was paired with each task version an
equal number of times across our subject population.
***
Fig. 7. Average number of false positives per trial plotted against the
three safe set types. There were significant differences between Standard
and Learned (p < .05) and between Standard and Conservative (p < .01).
There was no significant difference between Learned and Conservative.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. H1: False Positive Reduction over Standard
Our first hypothesis is that a Learned safe set that reflects
the supervisor’s intervention behavior would decrease the
number of false positives compared to the Standard safe
set. To test this, we performed a one-way repeated measures
ANOVA on the number of supervisory false positives from
Phase III of the experiment with safe set as the manipulated
factor. A false positive was any supervisor intervention where
the removed obstacle was actually detected by all nearby
robots, which would have avoided it successfully. The robot
team’s safe set had a significant effect on the number of
supervisory false positives (F (2, 20) = 8.72, p < 0.01). An
all-pairs post-hoc Tukey method found that the Learned safe
set significantly decreased (p = 0.0328 < 0.05) false posi-
tives over the Standard safe set, but there was no significant
difference between the Learned safe set and the Conservative
safe set (which also significantly decreased false positives
over the Standard safe set, with p < 0.01). These results
support our main hypothesis that representing supervisor
behavior as cognitive keep-out sets allows intervention
signals to be distilled into an actionable rule which will
decrease supervisory false positives.
The second half of that hypothesis, that decreasing su-
pervisory false positives will increase trust and team
performance was not shown conclusively from our data. We
performed a one-way, repeated measures ANOVA on the
pairwise comparison surveys between the teams using the
Learned and the Standard safe sets. Measures of trust showed
no significant improvement (F (1, 9) = 1.86, p = 0.21).
B. H2: Preference over Conservative
For 9 of 11 participants, the Learned safe set had shorter
avoidance arcs than the Conservative set. We hypothesized
Fig. 8. Regressed safe sets (viewed on the θ = 0 slice) from supervisor
intervention data overlaid on baselines. Three users’ safe sets clustered to
arcing like the Standard safe set. Three others clustered to arcing like the
Conservative safe set. The final five safe sets exhibit a distinct behavior that
reflects supervisors’ preference for gradual, pre-emptive arcs.
that this greater efficiency would make the tailored con-
servativeness of the Learned set preferable to the baseline
Conservative safe set. However, a t-test showed that the
survey responses for preference were statistically indistin-
guishable (p = 0.8) from a neutral score: an inconclusive
result for Hypothesis 2. We believe that this result stems
from users judging preference more on intelligibility, the ease
of avoiding false positives, than on efficiency, the shortness
of paths. As discussed in Section IV-A, both the Learned
and Conservative safe sets led to significant false positive
reductions over the Standard set.
This indistinguishability is further compounded since a
preference for intelligibility seems to be expressed by some
subjects in their Phase II intervention data, resulting in their
Learned safe sets having similar arcs as the Conservative safe
set (see Fig. 8). Future work could investigate this efficiency-
intelligibility trade-off further by using a conservative base-
line that is distinguishably more conservative than user safe
sets and by making efficiency more central to the team task.
C. Model Validity
The statistically significant decreases in false positives ob-
served in Phase III agree with the decreases predicted by the
supervisor model based on intervention data from Phase II.
Our model posits that interventions occur at states noisily
distributed about a safe set boundary. Therefore, it predicts
that the empirical distribution of Phase II intervention states
contained within a proposed safe set (see Fig. 9) will mirror
the proportion of false positive interventions observed in
Phase III: if states are deemed safe by the controller, they
will not be avoided, even when the noisy supervisor would
judge them to be unsafe. Since the Learned safe set controller
intervenes at the µˆ∗ level set (see Section II-C), exactly half
the intervention states will be contained within the Learned
safe set in expectation. The model’s predictions are compared
against observed false positives in Table 1.
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Fig. 9. Empirical distribution of intervention states observed during
data collection (Phase II of the experiment). The interventions within the
Conservative reachable set are colored in red, leaving 115 interventions in
the corresponding safe set. Similarly, the interventions within the Standard
reachable set are colored darker, leaving 397 interventions in the corre-
sponding safe set. Intervention states not contained within a reachable set
would have generated a false positive during the human-robot teaming task.
Interventions Predicted Average Observed
in Safe Set F.P. vs Std. F.P. F.P. vs Std.
Standard 397 / 440 100% 12.54 100%
Learned 220 / 440 55.4% 7.31 58.3%
Conservative 115 / 440 29% 4.68 37.3%
Table 1: Predicted and observed false positives. Left: Predicted false
positives from Phase II data. Right: Observed false positives in Phase III.
V. CONCLUSION
Automation with human supervisors relies on leverag-
ing the human supervisor’s cognitive resources for success.
Respecting these resources is essential for creating well
performing human-robot teams. It is especially important to
avoid overtaxing the human as automated teams continue to
scale up, and a single human worker both accomplishes more
and bears more cognitive load than ever. To alleviate this bur-
den, we can decrease the number of issues that command the
supervisor’s attention by reducing false positives. By model-
ing which system states command supervisory attention, we
can program autonomous systems to avoid those states when
they do not require attention. To capture this information, we
combine the concept of mental simulation from cognitive
science with formal safety analysis from reachability theory
to propose the noisy idealized supervisor model. We employ
the noisy idealized supervisor as the generative model in a
learning algorithm to predict supervisor safety judgements,
and we present a safety controller for robotic agents that
respects the supervisor’s perception of safety. This safety
controller is guaranteed to reduce false positives for idealized
supervisors. Furthermore, for actual supervisors, our human-
robot teaming user study demonstrated a significant reduction
in false positives when using our approach compared to the
standard baseline.
Our results show that it is possible to reduce false pos-
itives, and thus cognitive load, by aligning robot behavior
with humans’ expectations. Our approach is applicable when-
ever reachability theory can tractably analyze a dynamical
system that will be subject to human safety judgements.
Future work will explore the impact of this framework on
application domains from air traffic management to self-
driving vehicles.
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